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Following the fundamental recognition of its involvement in sensory-motor coordination
and learning, the cerebellum is now also believed to take part in the processing
of cognition and emotion. This hypothesis is recurrent in numerous papers reporting
anatomical and functional observations, and it requires an explanation. We argue that a
similar circuit structure in all cerebellar areas may carry out various operations using a
common computational scheme. On the basis of a broad review of anatomical data, it is
conceivable that the different roles of the cerebellum lie in the specific connectivity of
the cerebellar modules, with motor, cognitive, and emotional functions (at least partially)
segregated into different cerebro-cerebellar loops. We here develop a conceptual and
operational framework based on multiple interconnected levels (a meta-levels hypothesis):
from cellular/molecular to network mechanisms leading to generation of computational
primitives, thence to high-level cognitive/emotional processing, and finally to the sphere
of mental function and dysfunction. The main concept explored is that of intimate
interplay between timing and learning (reminiscent of the “timing and learning machine”
capabilities long attributed to the cerebellum), which reverberates from cellular to circuit
mechanisms. Subsequently, integration within large-scale brain loops could generate the
disparate cognitive/emotional and mental functions in which the cerebellum has been
implicated. We propose, therefore, that the cerebellum operates as a general-purpose
co-processor, whose effects depend on the specific brain centers to which individual
modules are connected. Abnormal functioning in these loops could eventually contribute
to the pathogenesis of major brain pathologies including not just ataxia but also dyslexia,
autism, schizophrenia, and depression.
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INTRODUCTION
The cerebellum is classically thought to control movement coor-
dination (Flourens, 1824; Luciani, 1891) and motor learning
(Marr, 1969; Albus, 1972) but recent experimental evidence sug-
gests that it may also play a key role in cognition and emo-
tion (Schmahmann, 2004; Schmahmann and Caplan, 2006; Ito,
2008)1. This clearly raises broader questions: how can the same
circuit cope with so many different tasks? Is signal processing
in the cerebellar circuits always based on the same computa-
tional scheme? Is it conceivable that what underlies the different
roles of the cerebellum is the specific connectivity of cerebellar
modules, rather than specific microcircuit properties? In order to
1We need to clarify the terminology used. We here treat brain functions on
a “neurological” level, where cognition and emotion are kept distinct. This
differs from the definition used in neuroinformatics, in which “cognitive
processing” refers to computational primitives—like pattern recognition, gen-
eralization, and abstraction by artificial neural networks. These definitions,
furthermore, should not be confused with the tenet of classic cognitive psy-
chology, which maintained that emotion is a category of cognition (Spitzer,
1998).
answer these questions, here we propose a conceptual and opera-
tional framework, or meta-levels hypothesis, based on four levels:
(1) cellular/molecular, (2) network, primitives of circuit process-
ing, (3) high-level cognitive/emotional processing, and (4) mental
processing. We first review neuroanatomical, neuropsychological,
neuropsychiatric, and neuroimaging studies in order to elucidate
how the cerebellum might take part in cognitive and emotional
functions, and how cerebellar damage could determine neuro-
logical and neuropsychiatric disorders. We then argue that the
cerebellum carries out basic computational functions, timing,
and learning, applicable in different cases. The cerebellum has
been reported to assist brain operations by providing accurate
timing of multiple series of signals coming from the cerebral cor-
tex and the sensory systems [reviewed in Bower (1997, 2002);
Jacobson et al. (2008); D’Angelo and De Zeeuw (2009); D’Angelo
et al. (2009, 2010); D’Angelo (2010a,b, 2011); De Zeeuw et al.
(2011)]. This could underlie the implementation of processes
like sensory prediction, novelty detection, error detection, time
matching, and sequence ordering (Ivry and Baldo, 1992; Ivry
et al., 2002; Ghajar and Ivry, 2009). This multi-dimensional com-
putation would allow the same circuit to contribute to functions
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as diverse as voluntary movement (a cognitive process, after all)
and thought, provided that appropriate connections with dif-
ferent cortical and subcortical centers were established and that
communication between these centers occurred over the appro-
priate frequency bands and using compatible codes (Ito, 1993,
2008; D’Angelo, 2011). We propose, therefore, that the cerebel-
lum operates as a general co-processor, whose effect depends on
the centers to which different modules are connected, affecting
cognitive functions as well as sensory-motor processing.
BRAIN PROCESSING AND THE CEREBELLUM
The cerebellum has long been linked to the concept of motor con-
trol but now several observations indicate that it is also involved
in cognitive/emotional processing. This extension of its role raises
a key question: is there formal similarity between these two types
of processing? A critical observation, in this regard, is that cog-
nitive and sensory-motor processing should not, in principle, be
very different. This prevents from a serious computational para-
dox: if the two processes were different, they may use different
coding strategies. But then, how could the basic neuronal circuit
of the cerebellum, which appears to be invariant across differ-
ent areas, be able to process different signal codes? This would
violate the idea that the cerebellum develops a single general algo-
rithm. Indeed, different sections of the cerebral cortex (sensory,
motor, and associative in nature) communicate with each other
as well as with various cerebellar areas and so the neural codes
are likely to be homogeneous. As a corollary of this, it is well-
documented that motor planning means predicting the sensory
consequences of a motor act: a motor plan is coded in terms of an
anticipated sensory state (Blakemore et al., 1998a,b). This is akin
to the general hypothesis of the “prediction imperative” that needs
to be satisfied in order to allow brain processing (Llinás and Roy,
2009). Prediction processes are normally performed by “forward
controllers,” which use internal memory to represent the sys-
tem state (Diedrichsen et al., 2010; Shadmehr and Mussa-Ivaldi,
2012).
IS THE CEREBELLUM A GENERALIZED FORWARD CONTROLLER?
On the basis of studies of the vestibulo-ocular reflex (VOR),
eye-blink conditioning, and saccadic eye movements, and the
fundamental theoretical concepts ofmotor learning (Marr, 1969),
the cerebellum has been suggested to provide forward models of
the motor system. These forward models can predict the pos-
ture or motion of body parts following a motor command and,
by a further transformation, predict the sensory consequences
of actions (Miall and Reckess, 2002). More precisely, a copy of
motor commands generated by the motor cortex (efference copy)
is sent to the cerebellum, which uses its internal forward model
to predict their sensory consequences (corollary discharge). The
sensory predictions are then compared to actual sensory feedback
(Wolpert et al., 1998): in the presence of errors (or novelty, i.e.,
deviations from prediction), the cerebellum emits corrective sig-
nals. A fully characterized example of generation of predictions
by cerebellar circuits is provided by electro-perception in weakly
electric fishes, in which a cerebellar-like structure compares the
expected electric field generated by the fish with the actual elec-
tric field sensed by the electroreceptors, thus gaining information
on the structure of the environment through the changes that this
latter has caused in the field itself (Bell et al., 2008).
In the presence of persistent deviations from prediction the
cerebellum learns to modify the forward model itself. Learning
appears to occur through two distinct processes, one faster and
more labile, involving the cerebellar forward controller, the other,
which may at least partly reside outside the cerebellum, slower
and consolidated (Shadmehr andMussa-Ivaldi, 2012). In fact, the
cerebellar cortex is thought to process the faster component of
memory, while the deep cerebellar nuclei may elaborate its slower
component (Medina andMauk, 2000). The cerebellum is thought
to share its “predictor function” with the parietal lobes, in such a
way that these two structures might work in parallel (Blakemore
and Sirigu, 2003): the cerebellum as a whole is likely to gener-
ate faster but unconscious predictions, while the parietal lobes
probably generate slower but conscious ones.
Given the anatomical connections of the cerebellum with asso-
ciative areas (see below) and the similarity of motor planning and
cognitive processing, it seems logical to generalize the forward
controller role of the cerebellum to cognition. Indeed, Ito (2005)
hypothesized that the cerebellum could operate as a generalized
forward controller regulating cognition as well as sensory-motor
control2.
THE FORWARD CONTROLLER AND MENTAL ACTIVITY
The fundamental postulate about brain/mind functioning is that
the brain generates a virtual reality (Churchland and Sejinowski,
1992; Churchland, 1998; Llinas and Paré, 1998), probably con-
ferring an evolutionary advantage by predicting possible envi-
ronmental configurations and allowing symbolic representation
and communication. Several observations show that perception
is not a copy of the external or internal energy patterns, but
rather a mental elaboration endowed with quality and deformed
by imperfect receptor sampling, adaptation, memories, and emo-
tions. This makes conscious perception unique and subjective. At
this point, onemay speculate on how the cerebellum, being deeply
interconnected with the cerebral cortex, might be involved in pro-
cessing conscious percepts. We propose a somewhat provocative
reflection.
A first issue is that whereas reality is perceived as instanta-
neous, computation in neurons and synapses actually takes time
and the cerebral cortex needs hundreds of milliseconds to gen-
erate a conscious percept. This delay, in addition to violating the
2A conceptual obstacle is that sensory-motor processing is thought to be
mostly automatic (and unconscious) while cognition and emotion are bound
to consciousness. Akin with this, the thalamo-cortical circuit is usually
thought of as the site of conscious processing and the cerebro-cerebellar cir-
cuit as the site of automatic control. Indeed, the cerebellum probably does not
take part in conscious representations directly, given that abnormalities of the
cerebellum do not seem to impair consciousness. In their hypothesis, Tononi
and Edelman suggest that the ability of circuits to generate consciousness lies
in the strength of their internal connectivity, which is quite high in the cor-
tex but comparatively much poorer in the cerebellum (Tononi and Edelman,
1998). This would explain why the cortex is capable of developing conscious
percepts, while the cerebellum is not. However, the cerebellum is deeply inter-
connected in closed loops with the cerebral cortex over multiple independent
lines involving associative as well as sensory-motor areas (see below), so that
the activity of the two structures is strongly integrated.
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idea of the instantaneity of subjective perception, is far too long
to allow movement and thought to be controlled in a purposeful,
dynamic, and interactive manner. Therefore, the virtual reality
generated by the brain has to be “anticipatory” and to occur
somehow in advance of the elaboration of objective reality based
on cortical processing of sensory signals. This anticipatory process
may be based on the use of previous information and memory on
various time scales, as would occur in a forward controller, which
is exactly what the cerebellum is thought to be. A second issue
is that reality is perceived as continuous, even though computa-
tional cycles during cerebro-cortical cognitive processing actually
last about 25ms (a γ-band cycle) and longer cycles about 100ms
(a θ-band cycle) (Buzsaki, 2006). The cerebellum, by exerting mil-
lisecond control of its output spikes, may help to maintain the fast
continuity required for spatiotemporal integration of conscious
percepts.
Thus, the fact that the cerebellum does not, clinically, appear to
be needed to generate consciousness (Tononi and Edelman, 1998)
does not mean that it is extraneous to the mechanisms controlling
the relationship between objective reality and internal represen-
tation. Indeed, functional activation of the cerebellum has been
revealed in relation to the conscious representation of time in
tasks using internal memories (Addis et al., 2009; Nyberg et al.,
2010; Szpunar, 2010, 2011). It should be noted at this point that
one main theory on the working of the cerebellum is that it acts
as a “comparator of intentionality with execution,” which is pre-
cisely what the whole brain continuously does in order to relate
neuronal activity to the world. On this basis, we conclude that
it can hardly be considered surprising that the cerebellum takes
part in cognition and emotion, that it can influence attention and
intelligence (Cotterill, 2001), and that its dysfunction can affect
“internal coherence” in dissociative diseases.
THE EXTENDED CEREBRO-CEREBELLAR LOOPS
The cerebellar cortex has, from the earliest studies, always been
reported to have a similar structure in all its sections, and its cir-
cuit to show a regular “lattice”-like organization (Eccles et al.,
1967) (Figure 1). The cerebellar circuit can be schematically
described as follows: mossy fibers activate granule and Golgi cells
in the granular layer. Granule cells emit parallel fibers and activate
all the other neurons in the cerebellar cortex. Golgi cells are dou-
bly activated by mossy and parallel fibers providing feedforward
and feedback inhibition to granule cells. The granular layer also
contains other interneurons, namely, Lugaro cells and unipolar
brush cells (only in the flocculo-nodular lobe). In the molecu-
lar layer, parallel fibers activate Purkinje cells and also stellate
and basket cells, which in turn inhibit Purkinje cells. Purkinje
cells are also activated by climbing fibers generated by the inferior
olive. Purkinje cells in turn project to the deep-cerebellar nuclei.
In this context, the modules and the cerebello-thalamo-cerebro-
cortical circuits (CTCCs) can be considered the main structural
elements.
THE CEREBELLAR MODULAR ORGANIZATION
Macroscopically, the cerebellum consists of a tightly folded layer
of cortex with white matter beneath in which deep nuclei are
embedded. At microscopic level, each part of the cortex consists
FIGURE 1 | Schematic representation of the cerebellar circuit. The
cerebellar circuit consists of cortical and subcortical sections. At subcortical
level, the afferent fibers activate DCN cells (DCN-C) and IO cells (IO-C).
The DCN emits the output and at the same time inhibits the IO. In the
cerebellar cortex, there are different types of neurons including granule
cells (GrC), Golgi cells (GoC), Purkinje cells (PC), stellate and basket cells
(SC, BC), Lugaro cells, and unipolar brush cells (not shown). The two main
inputs are represented by mossy fibers (mf) originating in various brain
stem and spinal cord nuclei, and by climbing fibers (cf) originating from the
IO. Signals conveyed through the mossy fibers diverge to DCN and activate
the granular layer (containing GrC and GoC). The ascending axon of the GrC
bifurcates in the molecular layer (containing PC, SC, and BC) forming
the parallel fibers (pf). The cerebellar cortical circuit is organized as a
feedforward excitatory chain assisted by inhibitory loops: mfs excite GrCs,
which activate all the other cortical elements. In the granular layer, inhibition
is provided by GoC, in the molecular layer by SC and BC. Finally, PC inhibit
DCN. The IO, which is also activated by brain stem and spinal cord nuclei,
controls PC activity though a single powerful synapse. Thus, the whole
system can be seen as a complex mechanism controlling the DCN output.
of the same small set of neuronal elements, laid out according
to a highly stereotyped geometry. At an intermediate level, the
cerebellum and its auxiliary structures can be broken down into
several hundred or thousand microzones or microcompartments,
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which are thought to represent effective cerebellar functional
units (Figure 2). These can be further differentiated into stripes,
zones, and multizonal microcomplexes, which are effective func-
tional modules (Andersson and Oscarsson, 1978; Apps and
Garwicz, 2005; Apps and Hawkes, 2009)3.
Amodule is a conglomerate of several, non-adjacent parasagit-
tal bands of Purkinje cells projecting to specific areas of deep
cerebellar nuclei and gating segregated projections from the infe-
rior olive (Cerminara, 2010; Oberdick and Sillitoe, 2011; Ruigrok,
2010). Likewise, the mossy fibers projecting to a certain group
of Purkinje cells through the granular layer also project to the
same deep cerebellar nucleus neuron receiving input from those
Purkinje cells (Ito, 1984; Pijpers et al., 2006; Voogd, 2010). The
modules have almost segregated inputs, since climbing fibers
bifurcate on the parasagittal plane to as many as 10 not necessar-
ily adjacent Purkinje cells (mossy fiber bifurcations spread across
both planes). Thus, the majority of connections between neurons
and interneurons in the cerebellar cortex occur within individual
modules. The connections between modules occur almost exclu-
sively via parallel fibers, which contact Purkinje cells and the other
inhibitory interneurons (Lainé and Axelrad, 1998; Dieudonné
and Dumoulin, 2000; Dean et al., 2004).
The modules have a very similar if not identical structure and
do not show major differences in their neuronal properties, even
though some variants have been reported. One of these concerns
the vestibulocerebellum, which contains an additional cell type,
the unipolar brush cell (Mugnaini et al., 2011), and may exhibit
more sustained discharges to Purkinje cells (Kim et al., 2011).
Another peculiar aspect is glycine feedback from the lateral cere-
bellar nuclei, which is sent only to the hemispheres and not to the
vermis (Uusisaari and Knopfel, 2012). Finally, evident organiza-
tion of genetic markers along the sagittal plane leads to a further
“biochemical” compartmentalization3. These local properties do
not undermine the general concept of a unified cerebellar com-
putational algorithm, but they may bias certain modules toward
specific functional states, as is thought to occur in other brain
circuits in relation to neuromodulators and neuropeptides (e.g.,
LeBeau et al., 2005).
The cerebellar circuit appears to be organized in a feed-
forward manner, with information passing through the cortex
without recurrent loops and with limited intermodular con-
nectivity. This is in apparent contrast with the cerebral cortex,
3The cerebellum is made up of large compartments generally known as zones,
which can be broken down into smaller compartments known as microzones.
The demonstration, by microneurography, of cortical zones shows that each
body part maps to specific points in the cerebellum, even though there are
numerous repetitions of the basic map forming an arrangement that has
been called “fractured somatotopy.” A different indication of compartmen-
talization is obtained by immune staining for certain types of protein (e.g.,
zebrin, NOS etc.). This reveals stripes oriented perpendicular to the cerebellar
folds. Different markers generate different sets of stripes, and the widths and
lengths vary as a function of location, but they all have the same general shape.
Oscarsson in the 1970s proposed that these cortical zones can be partitioned
into smaller units called microzones. In 2005, Apps and Garwicz showed that
several microzones can be organized into a multizonal microcomplex. All
microzones in the microcomplex are connected to the same group of deep
cerebellar nuclei and inferior olivary neurons and correspond to the cerebellar
modules defined by Voogd.
which shows zonal differences in thickness, in the proportion of
granular and pyramidal neurons, in intracortical connectivity, in
neuronal subtypes and spine distribution (Elston and DeFelipe,
2002; Douglas and Martin, 2004; Lubke and Feldmeyer, 2007).
Moreover, while there is poor intermodular connectivity in the
cerebellum, the cerebral cortex shows strong intercolumnar con-
nectivity [the relevance of which has been commented above
(Tononi and Edelman, 1998)]. Clearly, the different anatomo-
functional organization of the two cortices implies different
computational strategies. However, since the two cortices are
deeply interconnected through serial parallel loops, the product
of cerebro-cortical elaborations is continuously relayed to specific
modules of the cerebellar cortex. Thus, in addition to the need to
understand how cerebral and cerebellar cortical modules operate,
it is essential to look in more detail at this interconnection of the
two structures.
CEREBELLO-THALAMO-CEREBRO-CORTICAL CIRCUITS (CTCCs)
There is growing evidence that the CTCCs include several afferent
and efferent cerebral cortical areas of a motor, sensory, or associa-
tive nature (Figure 3) (Strick et al., 2009). Most cerebro-cerebellar
afferent projections pass through the basal (anterior or ven-
tral) pontine nuclei and intermediate cerebellar peduncle, while
most cerebello-cerebral efferent projections pass through dentate
and ventrolateral (VL) thalamic nuclei. Some of these loops are
here considered in more detail in relation to sensory-motor and
cognitive-emotional functions: themotor and somatosensory loops
(including those involved in oculomotor control), the parietal
loops, the prefrontal loops, the oculomotor loops, and the loops
formed with the basal ganglia and the limbic system. Cerebello-
cerebral loops are highly segregated (Habas et al., 2009; Krienen
and Buckner, 2009) and form complex interconnections also with
the basal ganglia and subcortical areas. Interestingly, during phy-
logenesis, the cerebellar hemispheres evolve in parallel with the
associative rather than the motor or sensory areas, which sup-
ports the progressive involvement of the cerebellum in cognitive
processing.
Motor and somatosensory loops
The cerebellum projects both to motor and somatosensory areas.
The output to the primary motor area (M1) is conveyed through
the VL thalamic nuclei projecting to layers IV and V, while out-
puts to the primary somatosensory area (S1) pass through the
intralaminar nuclei projecting to intragranular and superficial
layers (Molinari et al., 2002). Through these projections to MI,
the cerebellum can modulate motor cortex excitability in relation
to the incoming sensory input (Luft et al., 2005). The cerebel-
lum is also interconnected with premotor (Dum and Strick, 2003)
and supplementary motor areas (Rouiller et al., 1994) involved in
movement planning. Interestingly, transcranial magnetic stimu-
lation (TMS) of the lateral cerebellum can strongly affect the con-
tralateral cerebral motor cortex (Oliveri et al., 2005). Cerebellar
TMS regulates the functional connectivity between Purkinje cells
and deep cerebellar nuclei, modifying the excitability of inter-
connected motor areas, as shown by changes in motor-evoked
potential amplitude and in short and long intracortical inhibition
(Koch et al., 2009a).
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FIGURE 2 | The modular organization of the cerebellum. The picture
shows a flattened view of the cerebellum. Four ideal zones are shown in
color, each one containing microzones forming a multizonal microcomplex.
The microzones have the basic structure reported in the expansion on the
right (same symbols as in Figure 1, inhibitory interneurons are overlaid in
blue). A microzone is defined as a group of the order of 1000 Purkinje cells all
having the same somatotopic receptive field. These Purkinje cells are
arranged in a long, narrow strip, oriented perpendicular to the cortical folds,
so that Purkinje cell dendrites are flattened in the same direction as the
microzones extend and are crossed by parallel fibers at right angles. The
climbing fibers branches (about 10) usually innervate Purkinje cells belonging
to the same microzone and the olivary neurons generating such climbing
fibers tend to be coupled by gap junctions. This helps synchronizing Purkinje
cells within a microzone on a millisecond time scale. The Purkinje cells
belonging to a microzone all send their axons to the same small cluster of
output cells within the deep cerebellar nuclei. Finally, the axons of basket
cells are much longer in the longitudinal direction than in the mediolateral
direction (not shown), causing them to be confined largely to a single
microzone. Thus, cellular interactions within a microzone are much stronger
than those between different microzones.
Parietal loops
The cerebellum is closely connected with the parietal lobes. The
cerebellum sends input to area 7b of the inferior parietal lobe,
in particular to the anterior intraparietal (AIP) area, through
VL thalamic nuclei (Clower et al., 2001). AIP neurons are acti-
vated in response to the sight of an object, as well as to the act
of grasping it, in reach-to-grasp arm movements (Tunik et al.,
2005), and in the creation of crossmodal sensorial representa-
tions of objects (Grefkes et al., 2002). The cerebellar input to the
AIP passes through a specific “output channel” of the dentate
nucleus. The cerebellar-VL thalamic inputs to motor and pre-
motor areas send secondary afferents to the AIP (Clower et al.,
2005). The cerebellum also targets other parietal regions, namely
the ventral lateral intraparietal area (vLIP) and medial intrapari-
etal area (MIP) (Prevosto et al., 2010). Importantly, vLIP neurons
can represent salient visual stimuli and are important for visual
attentional control (Kusunoki et al., 2000), while the MIP is cru-
cial for visual-motor coordinate transformation (Grefkes et al.,
2004). In humans, the AIP is also connected to the ventral pre-
motor cortex, while theMIP shows relatively strong projections
to parahippocampal regions (Rushworth et al., 2006) forming
complex loops involving multiple cortical areas, the thalamus, the
cerebellum, and the basal ganglia.
Prefrontal loops
The cerebellum is reciprocally connected, through the thala-
mus (Middleton and Strick, 2001), with the medial prefrontal
cortex (MPFC) (Watson et al., 2009), the dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex (DLPFC) (Kelly and Strick, 2003), and the anterior
prefrontal cortex (APFC) (Krienen and Buckner, 2009). The
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FIGURE 3 | The cerebello-thalamo-cerebro-cortical circuits (CTCCs). The
figure represents schematically the bidirectional connectivity between the
cerebellum and the telencephalon, in particular with the cereberal cortex.
Telencephalic projections from the cortex and basal ganglia (through the
subthalamic nucleus, STN) and limbic areas are relayed to the cerebellum
through the anterior pontine nuclei (APN). The cerebellum in turn sends its
output through the deep cerebellar nuclei (DCN), red nucleus (RN), and
anterior thalamic nucleus (ATN) to various telencephalic areas including the
motor cortex (MC), the prefrontal cortex (PFC), the parietal cortex (PC),
and the temporal cortex (TC). These connections, which are supported
by anatomical and functional data, forming several bidirectional
cerebello-thalamo-cerebro-cortical circuits (CTCCs).
MPFC is important in saccadic movements and cognitive control
(Ridderinkhof et al., 2004) and is strongly involved in determin-
ing behavior on the basis of expectations (Amodio and Frith,
2006). Moreover, this cortical area plays a key role in fear extinc-
tion processes (Morgan et al., 1993; Milad and Quirk, 2002).
The DLPFC is particularly important in working memory con-
trol (Petrides, 2000), mental preparation of imminent actions
(Pochon et al., 2001), and procedural learning (Pascual-Leone
et al., 1996) and its functional alteration is involved in major psy-
choses (Weinberger et al., 1986, 1988; Dolan et al., 1993). The
APFC is less understood (Ramnani and Owen, 2004) but its main
function could be that of integrating multiple distinct cognitive
processes during goal-directed complex behaviors.
Temporal loops
The exact nature of the connections between temporal
areas—including the hippocampus and amygdala—and the
cerebellum is still unclear. However, some studies have shown
that the temporal cortex makes a “negligible” contribution to
the corticopontine fiber tract (both in humans and in macaque
monkeys) (Ramnani et al., 2006). This probably means that
the cerebellum is unlikely to receive strong direct afferents from
temporal areas. On the other hand, cerebellar fastigial nuclei
seem to project to several temporal areas, like the hippocampus
and amygdala (at least in monkeys and cats) (Heath and Harper,
1974). Accordingly, a recent human fMRI resting-state study
found significant functional connectivity between the bilateral
anterior inferior cerebellum and bilateral hippocampus and
temporal lobes (He and Zang, 2004). Furthermore, dynamic
causal modeling proved that, during a rhyming judgment task,
the cerebellum and the lateral anterior temporal lobe are strongly
and bidirectionally interconnected (Booth et al., 2007). More
extensive studies are clearly required in order to elucidate the
pattern of connectivity between the cerebellum and temporal
areas; however, it seems reasonable to speculate that there exists
some kind of functional interplay between these two structures.
Oculomotor loops
The cerebellum is also deeply involved in oculomotor regulation,
which involves several cortical and subcortical areas participat-
ing in automatic and cognitive control processes. Besides the
VOR, to which the cerebellar flocculo-nodular lobe is specifi-
cally devoted, the cerebellum is involved in the control of sac-
cadic and smooth pursuit eye movements (Alahyane et al., 2008;
Colnaghi et al., 2010; Panouillères et al., 2011). Both the lat-
eral and posterior cerebellum, mainly the vermis, are involved in
the control of ocular saccades (Robinson et al., 1993; Hashimoto
and Ohtsuka, 1995; Goffart et al., 2003). The lateral cerebel-
lum and the vermisare also involved in controlling the precision
and velocity of smooth pursuit movements (Takagi et al., 1999).
Saccades and pursuit, used in order to execute different cognitive-
perceptual tasks (basically, saccades are required when searching
for a static target, while pursuit is needed to trackmoving targets),
are thought to be different outcomes of a single sensory-motor
process aimed at orienting the visual axis (Xivry and Lefèvre,
2007). The cerebellum and the fastigial oculomotor region have
been shown to play a major role both in controlling the execu-
tion of saccades and in elaborating the visuospatial information
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concerning the target (Tilikete et al., 2006; Guerrasio et al., 2009).
The oculomotor system comprises different areas. The retina
projects to the superior colliculus (Lefèvre et al., 1998), which, in
turn, sends afferents to the cerebellum and the lateral intraparietal
area (LIP). The LIP is connected with the frontal eye field (FEF)
and the basal ganglia and superior colliculus gate input from the
FEF to the LIP (Straube and Buttner, 2007). A recent Diffusion
Tensor Imaging (DTI) study (Doron et al., 2010) showed the cere-
bellum to be strongly connected with the precentral gyrus and the
superior frontal gyrus, which take part in motor and oculomo-
tor processes as well as the processing of spatial working memory
(Boisgueheneuc et al., 2006). The cerebellum has thus been shown
to be deeply integrated in processes controlling both the motor
and cognitive components of eye movements.
Loops formed with the basal ganglia and limbic system
The cerebellum has recently been shown to form bidirectional
connections with the basal ganglia. The cerebellum-basal gan-
glia pathway starts from the dentate nucleus, goes through
the thalamus and reaches the striatum; the basal ganglia-
cerebellum pathway starts from the subthalamic nucleus and
ends in the cerebellar cortex, passing through the pontine nuclei
(Bostan and Strick, 2010; Bartolo et al., 2011). The cerebel-
lum is also thought to be connected with the limbic system,
although few anatomical studies are available. Low-frequency
stimulation of the cerebellar fastigial nucleus has an anti-
epileptogenic effect when seizures are induced by amygdaloid
kindling (Wang et al., 2008) and there exists evidence suggest-
ing that the cerebellum may be connected with the amygdala,
hippocampus, and septal nuclei (Snider and Maiti, 1976). The
cerebellum is also connected with the hypothalamus (Haines
et al., 1990) and, as indicated above, with limbic cortices like
the DLPFC.
FUNCTIONAL ACTIVATION OF CEREBRO-CEREBELLAR LOOPS
One of the greatest recent achievements of neurophysiology
has been to open a window on the mechanisms governing
cognitive and emotional functions. Techniques like fMRI and
Magnetoencefalography (MEG) have proved fundamental in this
respect, since they provide information on the localization and
correlation of active areas during controlled behavioral tasks.
Moreover, the use of TMS has made it possible to intervene selec-
tively on the CTCCs (by directly exciting or inhibiting or by
modifying synaptic plasticity). In this way, neuroanatomy can be
turned into functional connectivity, linking circuit organization
with system functions and behavior, so that mental activity and
major mental disorders can be explored on a physiological basis.
In parallel with these developments, understanding of cerebellar
functions is also improving greatly.
The close relationship between the cerebellum and cerebral
cortex was first revealed by crossed cerebellar diaschisis, a reduc-
tion in metabolism and blood flow in the cerebellar hemisphere
contralateral to a cerebral lesion (Beldarrain et al., 1997). Detailed
investigations have since provided structural and functional
evidence (see also below) of multiple cerebro-cerebellar loops
processing, in concert, sensory-motor and emotional/cognitive
tasks. In fMRI studies, cognitive and motor functions in human
CTCCs appear segregated (Salmi et al., 2010). A non-verbal audi-
tory working memory task was found to be associated with
enhanced brain activity in the parietal, dorsal premotor, and
lateral prefrontal cortices and in lobules VII–VIII of the pos-
terior cerebellum. A sensory-motor control task activated the
motor/somatosensory, medial prefrontal, and posterior cingu-
late cortices, and lobules V/VI of the anterior cerebellum. A
purely cognitive task activated fronto-parietal cerebro-cortical
areas and crus I/II in the lateral cerebellum. The tracts between
the cerebral and the cerebellar areas exhibiting cognitive and
sensory-motor activity are mainly projected via segregated pon-
tine (input) and thalamic (output) nuclei. For example, crus I/II
in the lateral cerebellum is linked with the DLPFC and is acti-
vated during cognitive tasks, whereas the anterior cerebellar lobe
is not.
Functional imaging studies have helped to confirm the rela-
tionship between the specific activation of the latero-posterior
lobe and cognitive processes during cerebellar damage, often
associated with a frontal-like syndrome (see below) with mem-
ory deficits and aphasia, thought dysmetria, and incoordination
between mental processing and motor execution (Arriada-
Mendicoa et al., 1999). Moreover, malformations of or damage to
the cerebellar vermis are commonly linked to affective alterations
(Schmahmann and Sherman, 1998; Tavano and Borgatti, 2010).
These observations support the view that cognitive/emotional
and motor functions are at least partially segregated in the cere-
bellum, with cognitive functions localized in the lateral-posterior
cerebellum.
FROMMOTOR CONTROL TO COGNITION AND EMOTION
Neurology classically considers the cerebellum in relation to
ataxia, i.e., the motor consequences of cerebellar damage. Ataxia
(from the Greekα–ταξισ, meaning “lack of order”) is a neu-
ropathological state consisting of gross lack of coordination of
muscle movements. It is caused by dysfunction of those parts of
the nervous system that coordinate movement and it includes
forms of cerebellar, sensory, and vestibular origin. Cerebellar
ataxia is expressed through a variety of elementary neurologi-
cal deficits, such as antagonist hypotonia, asynergy, dysmetria,
dyschronometria, and dysdiadochokinesia. How and where these
abnormalities manifest themselves depends on which cerebellar
structures have been damaged and whether the lesion is bilateral
or unilateral. In very general terms, we can observe three main
groups of symptoms4:
• impairment of body balance (Romberg test) and of eye move-
ment control (saccade alterations, nystagmus) due to specific
dysfunction of the vestibulocerebellum;
4According to a comparative anatomical, functional, and phylogenetic sub-
division of the cerebellum, the vestibulocerebellum (archicerebellum) can
be identified with the flocculo-nodular lobe, the spinocerebellum (paleo-
cerebellum) with the rest of the vermis and para-vermal areas, and the
cerebro-cerebellum (neocerebellum) with the cerebellar hemispheres. Hence,
evolutionarily, there is a progressive increase in cerebro-cerebellar connec-
tions, which reach their maximum development in primates and humans, in
parallel with the increased extension of the associative cortices.
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• impairment of gait (wide-based, “drunken sailor” gait,
characterized by uncertain starting and stopping, lateral devi-
ations, and uneven steps) due to dysfunction of the spinocere-
bellum;
• difficulty executing voluntary, planned movements due to
impairment of the cerebro-cerebellum. Disturbances include
intention tremor (coarse trembling, accentuated on the execu-
tion of voluntary movements, possibly involving the head and
eyes as well as the limbs and torso), peculiar writing abnor-
malities (large, uneven letters, irregular underlining), and a
peculiar pattern of dysarthria (slurred speech, sometimes char-
acterized by explosive variations in voice intensity despite a
regular rhythm).
Quite apart from their undisputed clinical importance, these
observations lend support to the idea that different motor func-
tions are localized in specific cerebro-cerebellar loops and that the
lateral cerebellum is involved, through cerebro-cerebellar loops,
in the cognitive components of movement planning. In addition,
on careful analysis, patients with focal cerebellar lesions have also
been found to show cognitive-affective alterations (Schmahmann
and Sherman, 1998) constituting a picture that might be called
dysmetria of thought. The concept of “dysmetria of thought”
or “cognitive dysmetria” has been proposed as a unitary neu-
rocognitive framework of reference for schizophrenia symptoms
[(Andreasen et al., 1998), see below] and involves a neural
network with the main nodes in the prefrontal cortex (PFC),
thalamus, and cerebellum. Cognitive dysmetria comprises:
• impairment of executive functions, such as planning, set-
shifting, abstract reasoning, working memory, and verbal flu-
ency;
• difficulties with spatial cognition, both in visuospatial organi-
zation and visuospatial working memory;
• personality change, with blunting of affect and/or disinhibited
and inappropriate behavior;
• language deficits including agrammatism, dysprosodia, and
mild anomia.
This constellation of symptoms, which is reminiscent of a pre-
frontal syndrome (Schmahmann, 2004; Schweizer et al., 2007), is
called cerebellar cognitive affective syndrome. Clearly these symp-
toms are not exclusive to cerebellar damage; indeed, the afore-
mentioned cognitive and affective alterations can also be found
in patients with disorders of the cortical associative areas (espe-
cially prefrontal) and paralimbic areas, or with disorders of the
subcortical areas to which the former are connected. It would
be safe to say that these symptoms involve the whole CTCC
loop. Anatomically, lesions of the posterior lobe are associated, in
particular, with cognitive symptoms, while lesions of the vermis
are consistently observed in patients with pronounced affective
alterations. The anterior lobe seems to be less involved in the
generation of these cognitive and behavioral deficits, while ante-
rior lobe lesions are well-known to cause motor ataxia (Diener
andDichgans, 1992) (Figure 3). Functional neuroimaging studies
have consistently shown: (1) activation in the anterior lobe dur-
ing motor learning and classical conditioning, (2) activation of
the posterior lobe during several kinds of purely cognitive tests
of executive functions (cognitive planning, set-shifting, work-
ing memory), language (verbal memory tasks, verb for noun
substitution, synonym generation), mental imagery, and sen-
sory discrimination, (3) activation of the vermal region during
tests evaluating emotional modulation. Finally, (4) abnormal
activation of the cerebellar vermis and posterior lobe has been
observed in several primary psychiatric disorders, most notably
schizophrenia, autism, and dyslexia, further discussed below.
THE EXTENDED COORDINATING AND PREDICTING ACTION OF THE
CEREBELLUM
The cerebellum is assumed to contribute to sensory-motor pro-
cessing in an automatic manner. After having received, analyzed,
and recognized a sensory or a motor pattern (as a prediction of a
future sensory state), the cerebellum produces gain and phase cor-
rections that make it possible to regulate the force and activation
of large sets of muscles 5. The predicted and actual patterns are
then compared; this is followed by the provision of appropriate
correction sand thus the generation of movement coordination.
As an extension of this, patterns coming from various cerebro-
cortical areas can be processed, allowing the “coordination” of
higher cognitive functions. Once activated, the CTCC loops could
be used not just for automatic but also for controlled functions.
These can be set in the more general framework of cognitive
control and executive function6.
The cerebellum may take part in cognitive control by regu-
lating executive functions, which it could do by manipulating
different “objects.” These can be considered parts of a set of
virtual representations, given that they may be purely symbolic
(e.g., thoughts) or applied to symbolic expression (e.g., speech)
or voluntary movement (which, after all, is based on a virtual
5Motor controlis preprogrammed in a feed forward manner and is based on
the coordination of elementary movements consisting of straight and curved
segments. These “jerks” can be modulated in delay, duration, and strength.
The analysis of a simple preprogrammed ballistic “jerk” movement, the sac-
cadic movement needed to direct the eye toward a desired target, has shown
that the cerebellum can indeed learn to control the beginning, the end, and
the velocity of this elementary segment of movement.
6Cognitive control is the ability to direct mental processing toward complex
targets. To achieve it, it is necessary to divert attention from actual sen-
sory inputs, prioritize, and coordinate sequences of actions, and prolong this
control until the target is achieved beyond immediate environmental interfer-
ences. Cognitive control allows regulation of executive functions, which can be
automatic or controlled. Automatic executive functions are driven bottom-up
through stimuli that activate internal behavioral modules, while the controlled
executive functions operate in a top-down manner and imply choices based
on general principles and experience. In general, once a controlled process is
learned, it can be transformed into an automatic process, thereby accelerat-
ing its execution. The main properties of executive functions are that they are
(1) goal-directed, (2) learned rather than innate, (3) multimodal; in addition,
they (4) require generalization, (5) require working memory, (6) have limited
capacity (only a few processes can be controlled at a time), and (7) require
choices and selections to focus attention on a selected target. Executive con-
trol can associate, coordinate, and select multiple inputs and outputs, learning
the procedure and generating behavioral flexibility and complexity. It should
be noted that these aspects of cognitive control do not formally differ much
from those of voluntary motor control.
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representation of its sensory consequences—see above). The cere-
bellum then integrates these multiple internal representations
(of a motor, sensory, or cognitive/emotional nature) with exter-
nal stimuli and with voluntary (or self-generated) responses.
Indeed, cognitive dysmetria, which is the loss of these functions,
is characterized by difficulty in prioritizing, processing, and coor-
dinating responses to incoming information (Andreasen et al.,
1996; Crespo-Facorro et al., 1999). Importantly, the involvement
of the cerebellum in executive functions becomes more prominent
as the complexity of these functions increases (Gottwald et al.,
2004). Deficits in semantic and phonemic fluency and poor per-
formances reported in some memory tasks can be traced back
to a deficit in executive functions. Moreover, performance on
“basic” attentional tasks (e.g., Go/NoGo) is substantially nor-
mal, but performance on “high level” attentional tasks (e.g., the
“divided attention” paradigm, where subjects have to respond
simultaneously to multiple cognitive tasks) is impaired (Baddeley
et al., 1984; Craik et al., 1996). Finally, patients with right-sided
lesions are more impaired than those with left-sided lesions. This
supports the idea of lateralization of cerebellar functions, with
verbal deficits mostly occurring in the presence of right cerebellar
lesions and visuospatial deficits tending to occur in left cerebellar
lesions. Clearly, this lateralization replicates the division of cog-
nitive competences between the two cerebral hemispheres, with
which the cerebellum is cross-connected via the pontine nuclei
and thalamus.
A similar role of the cerebellum in prioritizing, processing, and
coordinating responses to incoming information could underlie
cerebellar control of emotional experience7. Lesions of the cere-
bellum interfere with affective expectations from a given behav-
ioral context. This is evident in fear conditioning paradigms, in
which the relationship between a conditioning stimulus and a
frightening unconditioned stimulus can be precisely controlled
(Sacchetti et al., 2005). Vermal lesions can decrease reactivity
to frightening stimuli, probably by controlling the output to
the hypothalamus, amygdala, hippocampus, septal nuclei, and
nucleus accumbens. Likewise, neuroimaging studies show that
the cerebellum and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) are
strongly activated when a painful stimulus is expected after a
given cue (Ploghaus et al., 2003). While the cerebellum builds
up the expectation of pain, the ACC, which is strongly con-
nected with the cerebellum, plays an important role in several
neurocognitive mechanisms capable of modulating pain percep-
tion, mainly attention, expectation, and reappraisal (Wiech et al.,
2008). Moreover, the cerebellum, together with the ACC and
the insula, is strongly activated when perceiving pain in others
(Jackson et al., 2005), and these same structures (together with
the primary and secondary somatosensory cortices, putamen, and
thalamus) have been found to show activation that is related to the
7Emotional control, like cognitive control, has both a bottom-up and a top-
down component. In the first case, a somato-visceral reaction (emotional
response) is generated by detection of a significant pattern and the subject
learns about it and subsequently elaborates an emotion (the James-Lange
model). In the second case, the subject first elaborates an emotion and
this then activates appropriate somato-visceral responses (the Cannon-Bard
model).
intensity of pain (Coghill et al., 1999). Finally, the cerebellummay
also regulate the quality of emotional experience (Turner et al.,
2007). Patients with cerebellar stroke report reduced pleasant feel-
ings in response to happiness-evoking stimuli (while unpleasant
experience to frightening stimuli was substantially similar to that
recorded in controls).
The prefrontal cerebral cortex has classically been considered
to be the main station exerting cognitive control and the limbic
system cortices to be the ones primarily involved, together with
amygdala and hippocampus, in affective control. Infact, signals
processed in the cerebral cortex are continuously sent to subcorti-
cal structures, including the cerebellum, which then sends back to
the cortex signals able to refine and control cerebro-cortical pro-
cessing. This process resembles the control ofmovement planning
occurring in the sensory-motor CTCC loops (Figure 4).
META-LEVELS OF SIGNAL PROCESSING IN CTCC LOOPS
So far we have considered observations suggesting that the cere-
bellum, in addition to taking part in sensory-motor control,
is also involved in cognitive/emotional functions. These obser-
vations are based on evidence of cerebellar activation during
specific cognitive/emotional tasks and on the existence of connec-
tions between the cerebellum and relevant cerebro-cortical areas.
Moreover, we have tried to make sense of all this by setting cere-
bellar activity within the general framework of brain functioning
and cognitive control. But the question, now, is how can the cere-
bellum support these multiple operations? The basic hypothesis is
that the cerebellum uses, throughout, the same circuit structure,
and that different outcomes depend on the specific connections to
different brain areas. This also implies that the same code is used
for all the operations involving the cerebellum and that motor
control and cognition/emotion have an equivalent structure at the
level of spike coding.
On an operational level, in order to connect basic circuit func-
tions with cognitive/emotional and mental processing, a series
of meta-levels needs to be considered. Ideally, it should be pos-
sible, first, to demonstrate the connection between neighboring
meta-levels, and thereafter to link the cellular/molecular mecha-
nisms with cognitive/emotional processing and then with mental
function and dysfunction.
1. Cellular/molecular to circuit. As regards the relationship
between the cellular-molecular level and the circuit level of
cerebellar operations, several specific hypotheses have been
advanced, which are currently under investigation and have
been discussed elsewhere (D’Angelo, 2011). The idea, basically,
is that the cerebellum is able to exploit spike timing, neuronal
dynamics and long-term synaptic plasticity in order to process
incoming signals in the spatial, temporal, frequency, and phase
domains. At circuit level, timing and plasticity in neurons and
synapses can implement adaptable signal processing capabil-
ities, which appear to be the prerequisites for the emergence
of cerebellar processing (Hansel et al., 2001; D’Angelo and De
Zeeuw, 2009). The outcome of circuit operations on cerebellar
functions are themselves bound to signal timing and learning,
in line with the original main theories of the cerebellum as a
timing and learning device (Albus, 1972; Ivry and Keele, 1989).
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FIGURE 4 | The meta-levels of cerebellar activity. The figure depicts the
causal relationships between the functions that the cerebellum is thought
to play at different operative levels (meta-levels hypothesis) and between
these same functions and brain pathologies. The neuron and network level
lays in the blue box and is normally investigate using electrophysiological
and imaging techniques. These combined with mathematical models, allow
to infer the computational functions of the circuit (forward model, various
parameter transformation and detection of discrepancies between
predicted and actual signal patterns). Once integrated into the large-sale
connectivity of the CTCC loops, circuit computations lead to emerging
functions. At low-level (yellow boxes), these include learning, prediction,
and timing (cerebellar processing primitives), which can implement
structured cerebellar operations including forms of working
memory, error/novelty detection, and mental object manipulation.
The low-level functions lay at the basis of more complex high-level
functions (green box) including motor control, attention switching, language
processing, imagery and visuospatial processing, decision-making, and
reasoning. Major aspects of brain pathology (red box) can be predicted on
the basis of the low- and high-level functions. Emerging functions and
dysfunctions are usually investigated using non-invasive recordings (fMRI,
DTI, TMS etc.), neuropsychological and clinical assessments. As a whole,
the cerebellar function can contribute to global brain operations not
just of motricity but also of learning and memory, cognition, emotion,
attention, and even awareness.
While connecting circuit operations to emergent behaviors is
obviously a fundamental step in understanding how the cere-
bellum operates, cellular/molecular mechanisms pertain to a
different realm and will not be covered here (D’Angelo, 2011).
2. Processing primitives. At a low-level of complexity, cerebellar
circuit computations emerge in the operations of timing, sen-
sory prediction, and sequence learning. These can be tested in
simple experimental tasks and, once embedded in appropriate
CTCCs and larger brain systems, may be regarded as a basis for
explaining more complex sensory-motor cognitive-emotional
operations.
3. High-level cognitive processing. The outcome of processing
primitives, applied to complex behavioral operations and
involving multiple interconnected brain areas, could lead
to various high-level cognitive operations. These include
attention, language, working memory, visuospatial processing,
imagery, reasoning, and decision-making.
4. Mental processing and psychiatric diseases. At the highest
level, cognitive/emotional functions can be integrated into
mental processing. Dysfunction of the relative mechanisms
emerges through complex pathological manifestations includ-
ing autism, schizophrenia, depression, and dyslexia.
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THE CEREBELLAR PROCESSING PRIMITIVES
Understanding how the cerebellum contributes to somany appar-
ently disparate functions would be an enormous step forward as
it would mean understanding the common processing primitives
of the cerebellar circuit. The most plausible hypothesis is that the
cerebellum has a predictive function, i.e., the ability to anticipate
incoming information and thus to ensure that actions correctly
anticipate changes in the environment (Moberget et al., 2008).
This hypothesis has two parts. The timing hypothesis postulates
that the cerebellum is critical for representing the temporal rela-
tionship between task-relevant events, while the sensory prediction
hypothesis postulates that it is critical in generating expectan-
cies regarding incoming information (Ivry et al., 2002). The two
hypotheses are not mutually exclusive; rather, they seem to be set
at two different hierarchical levels, with timing being more ele-
mentary than prediction. Indeed, whereas timing is merely the
establishment of an ordered relationship between two elements,
the ability to predict future patterns (as in a forward controller)
requires, in addition, the ability to compare different incoming
patterns and predict their consequences on the basis of inter-
nally stored memory. Computationally, timing requires only one
processing line while sensory prediction requires several. In the
Pellionisz and Llinas hypothesis (Pellionisz and Llinàs, 1982), this
sensory prediction corresponds to a tensorial transformation in
the spatiotemporal hyperspace of the cerebellar circuit. Finally,
the cerebellum is likely to use internal memories to adapt its
computational schemes. The meaning of cerebellar learning has
been hotly debated, with controversy often arising over the role
of long-term synaptic plasticity in motor learning. Nonetheless,
compelling evidence suggests that learning helps to automate tim-
ing and sensory prediction with respect to specific motor and
cognitive sequences.
TIMING
Motor coordination, which fails in cerebellar patients, is essen-
tially a precise spatiotemporal sequence of movements of one
or more body segments, which must show appropriate posi-
tion, velocity, and acceleration. As Ivry underlines (Ivry, 2000),
the cerebellum probably operates as an internal timing system
providing a precise temporal representation for motor and non-
motor tasks. Experiments of “irregularity detection,” measuring
cortical mismatch-negativity, have indicated that the cerebel-
lum selectively contributes to processing the temporal properties
of stimuli (Ivry, 2000). With regard to time estimation abil-
ity (timing), a recent review (Koch et al., 2009b) showed that
the cerebellum is crucial when normal subjects are required to
estimate the passage of brief time intervals and when time is com-
puted in relation to given salient events. In turn, circuits involving
the striatum and substantia nigra, which project to the PFC, are
mainly implicated in processing supra-second time intervals in
relationship with various cognitive functions.
One critical issue in physics and biology is velocity estimation,
a process that could occur in different locations in the brain, such
as the thalamo-cortical circuit (Ahissar et al., 2000; Szwed et al.,
2003). As the cerebellum is a dedicated space-time processor, it
is to be expected that it is also involved in velocity estimation.
Indeed, a recent fMRI study (O’Reilly et al., 2008) identified a
region in the posterior cerebellum (lobule VII crus 1) that is
selectively activated during velocity judgment tasks (prospective
spatiotemporal model). Conversely, when perceptual judgments
are based only on the spatial (direction) characteristics of an
object, this specific area is not significantly activated. Moreover,
the functional connectivity between the posterior cerebellum and
the anterior putamen (bilaterally), which is involved in timing
(Matell and Meck, 2004), is enhanced during the velocity judg-
ment task, which is essentially perceptual, with an only minimal
motor component.
PREDICTION
As we have pointed out, the cerebellum has been considered to act
as a forward controller (Miall and Reckess, 2002; Wolpert et al.,
1998) implementing the contravariant transformations that are
necessary in order to convert predictive sensory plans into motor
representations. The involvement of the cerebellum is shown by
the ability to predict the sensory consequences of one’s own
motor actions. Typically, in the absence of visual feedback, cere-
bellar patients have great difficulty in estimating the direction
of pointing (Synofzik et al., 2008). The cerebellum signals dis-
crepancies between predicted and actual sensory consequences of
movements, triggering appropriate corrections. In a recent study,
subjects were required to use their right hand to move a robotic
arm; the motion of this arm determined the position of a sec-
ond robotic arm, which made contact with subject’s left palm.
Computer-controlled delays were introduced between the move-
ment of the right hand and the tactile stimulation on the left
palm. Activity in the right lateral cerebellar cortex, measured with
PET, showed a positive correlation with delay, i.e., with the time
prediction error (Blakemore et al., 2001). This suggests that the
cerebellum is less activated by a movement that generates a tactile
stimulation than by a movement that does not (which signifies an
error due to lack of sensorial feedback from the target). A sim-
ilar phenomenon is seen with tickling, whose sensory effect is
suppressed during self-stimulation (which signifies perfect can-
cellation of error) (Blakemore et al., 1998a). Accordingly, the
somatosensory cortex is significantly more activated by an exter-
nally generated tactile stimulus than by a self-generated one, and
the cerebellum has been shown to provide the signal needed to
attenuate the sensory responses to self-generated tactile stimuli
(Blakemore et al., 1998a, 1999; Blakemore and Sirigu, 2003).
LEARNING
Another basic function of the cerebellum is sequence learning. In
a scenario simulating the absence of coordination in ataxia, Shin
and Ivry (2003) showed that patients with cerebellar lesions were
not able to learn simultaneously presented spatial and temporal
sequences (conversely, patients with Parkinson’s disease were able
to learn these sequences, but not the relationship between them).
Along the same lines, cognitive sequencing functions can
be selectively damaged in patients with cerebellar lesions; for
example, patients with left-side cerebellar lesions perform poorly
on script sequences based on pictorial material and patients
with right-side cerebellar lesions on script sequences requir-
ing verbal elaboration (Leggio et al., 2008). These deficits
were not correlated with general intelligence, or with general
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neuropsychological impairment. Furthermore, they were found
both in patients with focal lesions and in subjects with degen-
erative cerebellar pathologies. It is noteworthy that when these
patients were asked to order a set of cards representing sev-
eral behavioral sequences, they were unable to work out the
correct order, even though they could correctly describe and
understand the meaning of the single cards. Interestingly, while
cerebellar patients are not necessarily impaired in learning simple
visual or spatial sequences, their ability to discriminate differ-
ent durations of auditory stimuli is generally impaired. Indeed,
learning sequences of auditory tones with different durations has
been found to be rather difficult for cerebellar patients, even
though the same patients can normally learn visual sequences
and sequences of tones with different frequencies but not differ-
ent durations (Frings et al., 2006; Ivry and Keele, 1989). These
data are obviously consistent with the “timing hypothesis”; how-
ever, the impairment in script sequences could be related to more
abstract cognitive processes and possibly to a lack of executive
functions.
The role played by cerebellar structures in sequence learning
depends on experience-related factors; in motor sequence learn-
ing tasks, the cerebellum shows prominent activation during early
phases of learning; instead, after extended practice, the activation
is located mainly at the level of the basal ganglia (Doyon et al.,
2002). Notably, within the early phase of learning, the activation
has been found to shift gradually from the cerebellar cortex to
the deep cerebellar nuclei (Medina and Mauk, 2000; Shadmehr
andMussa-Ivaldi, 2012). Moreover, some researchers hypothesize
that the cerebro-cerebellar loop is primarily involved in motor
adaptation processes (e.g., adapting to environmental changes or
perturbations), rather than in effective motor learning processes
(e.g., learning new sequences of movements), which could be pro-
cessed by cerebro-striatal circuits (Doyon et al., 2003; Debas et al.,
2010). The cerebellum, coupled with the PFC, is particularly
important in learning new visuomotor procedures by imitation
(Petrosini, 2007) in the manner of mirror neuron effects. Finally,
cerebellar damage can lead to severe impairment of non-motor
associative learning independently of motor alteration (Drepper
et al., 1999).
THE CEREBELLUM AND HIGH-LEVEL COGNITIVE
PROCESSING
The timing, predictive, and learning properties of the cerebellum,
once integrated within the circuits formed with the cerebral cor-
tex, basal ganglia, and limbic system, can lead to control of more
complex cognitive/emotional functions, including attention, lan-
guage, memory, imagery, and reasoning.
ATTENTION
The cerebellar contribution to attentive functions has been
revealed in several physiological and pathological conditions.
Both autistic and cerebellar patients show a selective impair-
ment in attention shifting from visual to auditory stimuli,
although attention focusing is normal (Courchesne et al., 1994a).
Moreover, the cerebellum, controlling the precision of saccades,
probably plays an important role in orienting attention to a visual
cue (especially in covert attention tasks). This role seems to be
linked to procedural spatial learning functions, which are strongly
related to the ability of the cerebellum to learn goal-directed tra-
jectories, as recently supported by experimental results (Burguière
et al., 2005) and computational modeling (Passot et al., 2009).
Indeed, patients with cerebellar lesions are able to correctly
orient visual attention but their reaction times are rather slow
(800 and 1200ms) compared with those of normal control sub-
jects (100ms on average) (Townsend et al., 1999). Attention
switching is reinforced when subjects have to reassign motor
responses to different stimuli. In agreement with this “attentive
hypothesis,” some cerebellar areas show significant activation,
measured with fMRI, during early phases of skill learning (both
for motor and non-motor skills) and during pure visual attention
tasks (Allen et al., 1997).
One theory is that the primary role of attention is to gen-
erate time-based expectancies of sensory information (Ghajar
and Ivry, 2009). Essentially the suggestion is that, the higher
the level of attention, the lower the performance variability,
because the subject is less likely to be distracted by irrele-
vant information. The authors observe that the cerebellum is
constantly activated after an attentional cue, independently of
actual execution of movements, and even if the preparation
of a potential motor response may be required. Accordingly,
the cerebellum is bilaterally activated when a cue precedes the
beginning of a motor task, whilst the primary motor cor-
tex is activated only—and mainly contralaterally—during the
execution of the task itself (Cui et al., 2000). Furthermore,
it has been shown that PFC-projecting zones of the cerebel-
lum process the symbolic content of sensory cues (Balsters and
Ramnani, 2008). Ghajar and Ivry argue that the cerebellum
may be actively involved in an attentional network comprising
mainly the PFC, the inferior parietal lobule, and the cerebellum
itself. The specialized role of the cerebellum might be to help
encode the precise timing of sensory predictions. Cerebellar pre-
dictive activity probably works in a time frame of 2.5 s, so that
events that fall within this window can be considered temporally
bound.
Thus, according to Ghajar and Ivry’s hypothesis, the predictive
function of the cerebellummay be seen as a defining trait of atten-
tion. However, we can speculate that, in many tasks, attention is
not necessarily closely bound up with sensory anticipation. The
execution of visual search and feature match tasks, for example,
may not rely on anticipatory mechanisms andmay not involve the
cerebellum directly. Nevertheless, cerebellar patients can fail in
tasks of this kind, too, because impaired ocularmovement control
may lead to incomplete exploration of stimuli.
LANGUAGE PROCESSING AND VERBAL WORKING MEMORY
The cerebellum is deeply implicated in language, involving both
motor and cognitive processing organized in the “phonolog-
ical loop.” Cerebellar pathology impairs acquisition of motor
skills and primary articulatory abilities and the resulting reduced
articulation speed impairs working memory for verbal material,
reducing sensitivity to the onset, rime, and phonemic structure
of language. This impairment of the phonological loop, in turn,
leads to difficulty in language acquisition and dyslexia (Nicolson
et al., 2001b) (see below).
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Cerebellar damage can result in impairment of verbal working
memory (Justus et al., 2005). Cerebellar patients demonstrate a
reduction of the “phonological similarity effect” (normal sub-
jects show more difficulties in memorizing phonologically sim-
ilar words than phonologically dissimilar ones). Desmond et al.
(1997) attempted to clarify the difference between the cerebel-
lar contribution to phonological “rehearsal” mechanisms and to
proper verbal working memory processes. During simple letter
repetition tasks under fMRI, specific areas of the posterior ver-
mis (lobules VI and VIIA) and of the cerebellar hemispheres (left
superior HVIIA, right HVI) were activated. The same areas were
activated together with an additional part of the right cerebellar
hemisphere (HVIIB) during a sequential verbal working mem-
ory task. It was hypothesized that (1) HVIIA and HVI activations
represent input from the frontal lobes (which are connected with
the articulatory control processes of verbal working memory) and
that (2) HVIIB reflects input from temporal and parietal areas
(which, in turn, are probably the key areas of the phonologi-
cal store), and that the function of the cerebellum during verbal
working memory tasks could be to compare the output of sub-
vocal articulation with the content of the phonological store. The
verbal working memory deficit in cerebellar subjects is specific
and is, both “forward and backward,” independent of dysarthric
symptoms, which suggests that the cerebellum is involved in
the initial phonological encoding and, possibly, in strengthening
memory traces (Ravizza et al., 2006). In normal subjects, single-
pulse TMS delivered to the cerebellum during the encoding phase
of a verbal working memory test does not affect the accuracy
of the performance but lengthens the reaction times (Desmond
et al., 2005). Clearly, the involvement of the cerebellum in linguis-
tic processing reflects the role of this structure in timing, learning,
prediction, and attention.
Cerebellar patients show poor performances on phonologi-
cal verbal fluency tasks, but not on semantic verbal fluency tasks
[(Leggio et al., 2000); but see Smet et al. (2007)], and there-
fore show a dissociation between their processing of phonological
and semantic material. Patients with aright posterolateral cere-
bellar lesion are selectively impaired in verb-noun associations
(Gebhart et al., 2002). This impairment is not observed when the
task is to associate verbs with visual stimuli (pictures of objects)
(Richter et al., 2004). It should be noted that cerebellar patients,
unlike patients with Parkinson’s disease, are normally able to
perform category learning tasks (Maddox et al., 2005). When
listening to disyllabic stimuli, subjects with bilateral cerebellar
pathology do not show the phoneme-boundary effect generally
shown by neurologically normal subjects. This may be due to their
impaired ability to discriminate between intervals of different
duration (Ackermann et al., 1997). Clinical studies also suggest
that cerebellar pathology can play a causal role in prefrontal apha-
sic symptoms (Marien et al., 1996). Moreover, cerebellar activity
switches hemispheres (from right to left) according to recruit-
ment of right PFC, during linguistic tasks, in aphasia following
a stroke of left cerebral hemisphere (Connor et al., 2006).
The (right) cerebellum is strongly activated during seman-
tic disambiguation tasks (Bedny et al., 2008) and, bilaterally,
during lexical decision tasks with semantic priming (Rissman
et al., 2003). The cerebellum is activated during different kinds
of verb-noun association tasks (Seger et al., 2000). Also, the
cerebellum is strongly activated by semantic discrimination tasks
and the intensity of the activation correlates positively with the
difficulty of the task (Xiang et al., 2003). Finally, it should be
noted that cerebellar theta-burst stimulation with TMS has been
shown to selectively enhance associative priming, while semantic
priming was unaffected (Argyropoulos, 2011).
IMAGERY AND VISUOSPATIAL PROCESSING
The cerebellum is involved in pure imagery processes, both motor
(Ryding et al., 1993; Naito et al., 2002) and visual (Ishai et al.,
2000; Mellet et al., 2000). Indeed, patients affected by unilat-
eral cerebellar stroke show slowed or impaired motor imagery
(González et al., 2005; Battaglia et al., 2006). Moreover, cerebellar
patients are impaired in tests of mental rotation of objects (a typ-
ical example of a visual imagery process) while, at the same time,
failing to show significant deficits in tasks evaluating basic per-
ceptual functioning or sensory discrimination (Molinari et al.,
2004). Some cerebellar patients show purer perceptual alterations,
such as hemispatial neglect (Silveri et al., 2001), and there is evi-
dence that the cerebellum could be involved in metric judgment
processes, as tested in the line bisection task (Fink et al., 2000).
The neural networks involved in imagery processes show a
strong inter-individual and inter-trial variability; for example,
Gerardin et al. (2000) found the cerebellum to be constantly
activated during actual execution of motor actions, whilst there
emerged strong inter-individual differences in its degree of activa-
tion during the execution of motor imagery tasks. Along the same
lines, Grealy and Lee recently described a cerebellar patient found
to be more impaired in monitoring imagined simple actions than
in controlling the actual execution of the same actions (Grealy
and Lee, 2011). Conversely, a different study reported cerebel-
lar activation only during actual execution of motor acts and
not while imaging the same acts (Nair et al., 2003) and a fur-
ther one reported reduced cerebellar activity during imagined
movements compared with actual execution of the same move-
ments (Lotze et al., 1999). These heterogeneous results may be
explained by individual differences, differences in the nature of
the cerebellar lesions, and in the complexity or novelty of the tasks
involved. However, another possible reason for the aforemen-
tioned differences could be that the cerebellum is actively engaged
in manipulating and monitoring mental images rather than in
generating them. In the last two studies (Lotze et al., 1999; Nair
et al., 2003), the subjects were asked to imagine themselves exe-
cuting relatively simple finger-tapping movements. Conversely,
in the other study (Grealy and Lee, 2011) the patient was asked
to imagine himself doing a pointing movement toward a spe-
cific location in space and to guess the amount of time required
to execute the complete movement. Thus, in this case, the sub-
ject (who showed no difficulties of any kind in generating mental
images) needed to actively monitor his motor imagery process
and to estimate specific spatiotemporal information. Similarly,
in the other reported studies linking the cerebellum with motor
imagery, subjects were required to extrapolate some specific infor-
mation from their imagery processes and/or to mentally imagine
rather complex activities, such as playing tennis. In the same way,
visual imagery tasks often require subjects to infer some kind
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of information from the mentally generated images and/or to
actively manipulate these mental images (e.g., mental rotations).
It is thus possible that the cerebellum is primarily engaged in
manipulating mental images and in estimating spatiotemporal
information related to dynamic motor imagery processes, whilst
the pure generation of mental images probably does not rely
primarily on cerebellar computations.
Furthermore, studies on hemicerebelloctomized rats, not dis-
playing pure (declarative) spatial memory alteration, suggest
that the cerebellum can play a major role in spatial navigation
(Petrosini et al., 1998; Foti et al., 2010) and could be involved in
developing procedural spatial search strategies.
DECISION-MAKING AND REASONING
The cerebellum is involved in decision-making under uncertainty
(Blackwood et al., 2004) (probabilistic reasoning), which suggests
that it can construct probabilistic models of external events. In
a two-alternative forced-choice task condition, brain processing
advances in four stages: processing of sensory information, option
evaluation, intention formation, and, finally, action execution. In
a recent MEG study (Guggisberg et al., 2007), the cerebellum
and the inferior parietal cortex showed high frequency activity
(gamma-band) during the intention formation and action exe-
cution stages (and, in some conditions, also during the option
evaluation stage, mainly when all the options had the same value).
The cerebellum is also likely to be involved in reasoning
processes of different types. For example, cerebellar activation
has been observed during probabilistic and deductive reasoning
(Osherson et al., 1998). Interestingly, deductive reasoning prefer-
entially activates the left cerebellar hemisphere, while inductive
reasoning activates the right cerebellar hemisphere (Goel and
Dolan, 2004). Cerebellar activity in deductive reasoning seems
to be independent of the presence/absence of semantic content
(Goel et al., 2000), and also of its nature, concrete, or abstract
(Goel and Dolan, 2001).
Although the meaning, if any, of cerebellar activation in rea-
soning is not fully understood, the cerebellum is thought to take
part in creating and controlling adaptive working models of the
environment, in cooperation with cortical structures, mainly the
PFC (Vandervert, 2003; Vandervert et al., 2007). Indeed, there
is interesting evidence that logical reasoning could be based on
specific mental models and that, in turn, the internal struc-
ture of these models could directly influence the reasoning pro-
cess (Johnson-Laird, 1980; Schaeken et al., 1996; Johnson-Laird,
2001). Therefore, the cerebellum could play an important role in
manipulating the mental models required for logical reasoning.
MENTAL PROCESSING: CEREBELLAR INVOLVEMENT
IN NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS
Abnormal cerebellar processing can lead to alterations in mental
functions. Cerebellar patients often show mood disorders, per-
sonality change, cognitive disorders, and dementia which may
be integrated into the pathological frameworks of schizophrenia,
depression, autism, and dyslexia. The rate of psychiatric mor-
bidity associated with cerebellar degenerative diseases is about
double that found in normal subjects (Leroi et al., 2002): 77% of
patients with cerebellar degenerative diseases are affected by
psychiatric disorders, compared with only 41% of neurologi-
cally healthy control subjects. Interestingly, the components of
cognitive processing related to cerebellar activity also appear to
be related to the pathogenesis of these diseases.
SCHIZOPHRENIA
Schizophrenia is a mental disorder characterized by a dissociation
between internal representations and external reality. It is known
that “cognitive dysmetria,” typical of psychoses like schizophre-
nia, is also observed in cerebellar patients. A role of the cerebellum
in early onset schizophrenia was recently reported in a DTI study
which revealed reduced fractional anisotropy in the white matter
of the parietal association cortex and in the left cerebellar pedun-
cle (Kyriakopoulos et al., 2008). Moreover, neurological soft signs
in schizophrenic patients are inversely correlated with volume
of the right cerebellar hemisphere (Bottmer et al., 2005). The
cerebellar dysfunction may impair the ability of schizophrenic
subjects to recognize an action on the basis of a subject’s inten-
tion. Indeed, schizophrenic patients are not able to correctly
estimate the sensory consequences of their own actions (Synofzik
et al., 2010), a deficit usually observed in cerebellar patients. In
other words, this means that the consequences of their actions
are not in agreement with the expected sensory results of these
actions and with the subject’s intentions. This is hardly surprising
given the predictive function of the cerebellum.
Neuroanatomically, there is evidence showing that damage
to a CTCC could be the primary pathophysiological alteration
in schizophrenic patients (Konarski et al., 2005). Several imag-
ing studies (CT, MRI) have reported abnormal volume of the
cerebellar vermis (either hypoplasia orhyperplasia), while others
have reported global cerebellar atrophy. Cerebellar hypoactiva-
tion (or even non-activation) has been measured with fMRI in
cognitive tasks involving the prefrontal-cerebellar loop, tasks such
as the (1) Wisconsin Card-Sorting Test, (2) working memory
[n–back] task, and (3) periodic sequence-learning tasks. An onto-
genetic substrate can be traced back to abnormalities in infant
motor development (IMD) and executive function development
(Ridler et al., 2006). IMD and executive function development are
normally associated with increased gray matter density (GMD)
in the premotor cortex, striatum, and cerebellum, reinforcing the
fronto-cerebellar network. Schizophrenic patients have delayed
IMD and deficits in executive functions correlating with disrup-
tion of the fronto-cerebellar network. In postmortem studies,
reduction in the size of the anterior vermis in schizophrenic
patients is associated with reductions in the density and size
of Purkinje cells. Moreover, the synaptogenesis process could
be impaired, both for excitatory and inhibitory neurons, and a
core alteration may concern the NMDA receptors and synaptic
plasticity (Stephan et al., 2009).
Overall, in view of the reported impairment of the cerebellum
and Purkinje cells, it can be hypothesized that the neural basis
of schizophrenia might partially overlap that of autism (Boso
et al., 2010). Considering the general function of the cerebel-
lum, it is possible that schizophrenic patients are impaired in
switching from an egocentric frame of reference to an allocentric
one (Yakusheva et al., 2007). In agreement with this hypothe-
sis, when asked to imagine an object from another perspective,
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schizophrenic individuals make more egocentric errors than do
controls (Langdon et al., 2001; Shenton et al., 2001).
AUTISM
Autism is a developmental disorder defined by three core features:
(1) impairment in social interaction, (2) impairment in commu-
nication, with a delay in language acquisition, and (3) repetitive,
stereotyped behaviors. More specifically, autistic subjects show a
selective difficulty in understanding intentions and beliefs (Frith
et al., 1991). Cerebellar patients and autistic subjects have shown
a similar impairment in shifting attention between auditory and
visual stimuli (Courchesne et al., 1994a). It is possible, given the
critical role of the cerebellum in revealing differences between
predictions elaborated by the cortex and the objective reality con-
veyed by experience, that dysfunction of CTCCs may prevent the
detection of novelty and impair attention switching (Boso et al.,
2010).
The cerebellum and the brainstem (including the inferior
olive) are significantly smaller in autistic patients than in healthy
controls (Hashimoto et al., 1995; Bauman and Kemper, 2005).
The Purkinje cells of the cerebellum are reduced, primarily in the
posterior inferior regions of the hemispheres. In the limbic sys-
tem (hippocampus, amygdala, and enthorinal cortex), neurons
are small and show increased cell-packing density.
Decreased exploration of the environment in autistic children
(a typical autistic behavioral trait) is correlated with the mag-
nitude of cerebellar hypoplasia of the vermal lobules VI–VII.
The rate of stereotyped behavior is negatively correlated with
the size of cerebellar vermal lobules VI–VII and positively cor-
related with frontal lobe volume in the same autistic subjects
(Pierce and Courchesne, 2000). Interestingly, two types of cere-
bellar pathology have been identified in autism (Courchesne et al.,
1994b): hypoplasia of the posterior vermal lobules VI and VII and
hyperplasia of the same lobules. This is particularly relevant if we
consider that vermal hyperplasia has also been found in subjects
affected by Williams syndrome, a genetic disorder characterized
by hyper sociability, social disinhibition, deficits in general intelli-
gence, and visuospatial abilities, in the presence of preserved facial
processing and language ability (Schmitt et al., 2001). Conversely,
autism is characterized by social withdrawal and isolation. From
the perspective of “social cognition,” these two pathologies can be
seen as opposites (Riby and Hancock, 2008).
A neural response in the cerebellum, as in the visual cor-
tex, is observable when processing a broad set of emotional
facial expressions (happy, fearful, sad, angry, and disgusted faces)
(Fusar-Poli et al., 2009). Conversely, the amygdala is selectively
activated by happy, fearful, and sad faces, and the insula by dis-
gusted and angry expressions. Alongside this evidence, an fMRI
study has shown that the cerebellum is activated during implicit
processing of facial expression, while temporal lobe regions are
activated during explicit processing (Critchley et al., 2000a).
Notably, when implicitly processing emotional expressions, sub-
jects with high-functioning autistic disorders do not activate the
left amygdala and the left cerebellum (Critchley et al., 2000b).
Abnormalities related to the autistic spectrum disorders have
been found in spinocerebellar ataxia (SCA) patients (SCA3 and
SCA6 patients), who show reduced performance on the Theory
of Mind Test, in spite of showing normal attribution of social
and emotional responses. These subjects also performed poorly
in executive functions and memory tasks, but not in spatial and
calculation tasks (Garrard et al., 2008). A previous study also
found a specific cerebro-cerebellar network associated with “attri-
bution of intention” tasks; this network is composed of the right
medial and inferior parietal cortex, the temporal lobes, and the
left cerebellum (Brunet et al., 2000).
DEPRESSION
According to the DSM-IV (APA, 1994), a depressive disorder is
characterized by a depressed mood and a loss of interest in daily
activities. Depression can also be characterized by the presence of
cognitive symptoms, such as weak working memory processing
and impairment in executive functions (Fales et al., 2008).
A recent paper (Savitz and Drevets, 2009) reviewed neu-
roimaging studies (MRI and PET) in major depressive disorder
(MDD) and bipolar disorder (BP), a mood disorder defined
by the presence of manic episodes with (or without) depressive
episodes. In MDD and BP, frequent findings are: (1) hyperme-
tabolism with volume loss in the hippocampus and in the orbital
and ventral PFC, and (2) hypometabolism in the dorsal PFC.
Another study in MDD patients (Fitzgerald et al., 2008) reported
constant hypoactivity in the cerebellum, insula, and frontal and
temporal cortices. An increase in the activity of these areas cor-
relates with anti-depressant treatment. Similarly, a recent work
reported reduced regional homogeneity in the right insula and
the left cerebellum in MMD patients and their siblings (Liu et al.,
2010).
The cerebellum is likely to play an important role in modulat-
ing depressive symptoms; for example, it has been reported that
high-frequency repetitive TMS over the cerebellum can cause a
mood improvement in normal subjects and a significant reduc-
tion of depressive symptoms (Schutter and Honk, 2005). This
is particularly interesting if we consider that this effect is prob-
ably dopamine-mediated; thus, the cerebellum is likely to exert a
strong influence on the basal ganglia, regulating mood. Moreover,
patients affected by SCA often showmild depression (Klinke et al.,
2010), especially those with SCA1 and SCA6. A voxel-based mor-
phometry study (Peng et al., 2010) reported GMD reductions in
the bilateral insular cortex and left cerebellum in first-episode
MDD patients, associated with decreased GMD also in the right
medial and left lateral orbitofrontal cortex, right DLPFC, bilateral
temporoparietal cortex, right superior temporal gyrus, and left
parahyppocampal gyrus. Moreover, in MDD patients, the cere-
bellum, dorsal ACC, and precuneus show reduced connectivity
with the orbital frontal cortex (Frodl et al., 2009).
As already explained, the cerebellum is connected with brain
areas involved in emotional control, including the PFC and the
hypothalamus (Zhu et al., 2006); however, a clear functional
mechanism able to account for cerebellar involvement in mood
regulation remains to be identified. Remarkably, MDD patients
with psychotic disorders, when compared with MDD patients
without psychotic disorders, show reduced perfusion of the left
cerebellum and right superior frontal cortex, as well as increased
perfusion of the left inferior PFC and caudate nucleus (Gonul
et al., 2004). In addition to the intriguing aspects raised by this
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lateralization, these observations suggest that, in MDD, cerebellar
activity correlates more closely with psychotic traits (e.g., delu-
sions of control) than with “pure” depressive symptoms. The
cerebellum is also involved in BP, with bipolar patients found to
show poor emotional homeostasis, mania, and cognitive dysfunc-
tions (Strakowski et al., 2005) and, on MRI scanning, a volume
reduction in region V2 and V3 of the cerebellar vermis (Mills
et al., 2005; Monkul et al., 2008).
DYSLEXIA
Developmental dyslexia (DD) is characterized by a selective diffi-
culty in acquiring reading skills, in spite of normal general intelli-
gence (Habib, 2000). There are three main hypotheses regarding
the core deficit responsible for DD symptoms: the magnosys-
tem deficit hypothesis (MDH) (Stein, 2001), the phonological
deficit hypothesis (PDH) (Ramus, 2003), and the cerebellar deficit
hypothesis (CDH). The MDH takes its name from the “magno-
cellular neurons” of the lateral geniculate nucleus, which mostly
feed the visual “dorsal stream” dedicated to the analysis of move-
ment (the “where” pathway). Normal magnocellular function is
necessary for high motion sensitivity and stable binocular per-
ception which, in turn, are essential for proper development of
orthographic skills. Many dyslexics show poor visual localiza-
tion and their motion sensitivity is impaired, which suggests
that abnormal development of the magnocellular system could
play a pathogenetic role in DD. The PDH postulates that DD is
caused by an impaired ability to represent and process speech
sounds. The CDH, on the other hand, is based on the observa-
tion that dyslexic children show deficits in motor coordination,
motor skills, and automatic processing, which suggests that a
cerebellar dysfunction constitutes the neurological basis of the
disease (Fawcett and Nicolson, 2004). Indeed, in a PET study,
dyslexic subjects learning a motor sequence showed abnormal-
ities in cerebellar activation during both automatic processing
and new learning. An early cerebellar deficit has been hypoth-
esized to impair the development of articulatory and writing
skills (Nicolson et al., 2001b), and non-fluent articulation would
engage more attentional resources, thereby impairing sensory
feedback processing. It can thus be hypothesized that a cerebellar
impairment causes a marked phonological deficit which, coupled
with an automation deficit, results in DD. Cerebellar dysfunction
can also explain the specific impairment in time estimation tasks
shown by dyslexic subjects (Nicolson et al., 2001a). On the whole,
the PDH can be seen as a part of the CDH. Conversely, the CDH
does not completely explain theMDH, even though there is a sub-
type of DD characterized by magnocellular impairment (Tallal
et al., 2006).
Dyslexics show small right cerebellar anterior lobes on MRI
(Eckert et al., 2003), suggesting that a fronto-cerebellar circuit
impairment could indeed cause the symptoms of DD. The right
cerebellum is the brain area that best discriminates dyslexics
from healthy control subjects (Pernet et al., 2009). Moreover,
dyslexic subjects have symmetric cerebellar (as well as parietal
and temporal cortex) gray matter, while healthy controls show a
greater asymmetry (Hier et al., 1978; Rae et al., 2002). Therefore,
there is substantial evidence that the cerebellum takes part in the
pathogenesis of DD.
DISCUSSION
Recently, an impressive amount of new data has revealed a dis-
concerting heterogeneity of functional roles attributed to the
cerebellum. Here we propose a unified framework that might pro-
vide a logical explanation of the numerous operations in which
the cerebellum is involved.
DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OR DISPARATE OPERATIONAL
PROCESSES?
Ito, highlighting that the cerebellum can acquire forward models
of a controlled object (e.g., the arm) through practice, proposes
that the cerebellum uses internal models in order to adapt motor
acts and mental activities to contextual information (Ito, 1993,
2008). By virtue of these models, the cerebellum is able to exert
fast, precise, and automated control of well-learned movements.
If we also think of thoughts and cognitive processes as controlled
objects, the logical conclusion is that these same internal models
can be applied to cognitive processing as well. This is hardly sur-
prising, as mental products are virtual objects and there may not
bemuch difference between a “thought” and a “thought to move.”
Along the same lines, Vandervert conjectures that the cerebel-
lum is engaged in a dynamic interplay with working memory;
his main idea is that repetitive working memory processes are
actively adapted by the cerebellum and that this must result in
better and faster attentional control and, consequently, in more
precise and better timed cognitive processes (Vandervert, 2003,
2007; Vandervert et al., 2007).
Again, a comparable theoretical framework was advanced
some years ago by Courchesne and Allen (1997). They hypothe-
sized that the main function of the cerebellum is to predict the
internal conditions required for different cognitive and motor
activities and to rapidly and precisely set those conditions.
Arguably, this “predict and prepare” function of the cerebellum
must be implemented mainly unconsciously and automatically.
Accordingly, the cerebellum is thought to be involved in implicit
learning and, on the contrary, not to play a relevant role in declar-
ative, explicit learning (Doyon et al., 1997). The cerebellum is
likely to adopt a “trial-and-error” learning rule, unlike the cere-
bral cortex and basal ganglia, which seem to learn, respectively,
through frequency-based and reward-based rules (Doya, 2000).
Finally, Ivry suggested that the cerebellum is involved in every
task requiring precise timing processes (Ivry et al., 2002), includ-
ing the production of skilled movements, eye-blink conditioning,
duration discrimination of perceptual events, fast and precise
regulation of attention and working memory, and some specific
linguistic skills.
Other proposals are that the cerebellum is directly involved in
cognitive/emotional processes, insofar as these are linked to some
kind of motor or oculomotor activity (Doron et al., 2010), and
that the main function of the cerebellum is to regulate the acquisi-
tion of sensory data across several sensory modalities, and thus to
support various sensory, motor, and cognitive functions (Petacchi
et al., 2005).
Clearly, although these frameworks are valid for interpreting
data sets relative to specific experiments or methodologies, the
link between these observations has remained largely specula-
tive or unaddressed. Moreover, the involvement of the cerebellum
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in some cognitive functions, like attention, language, mental
imagery, and reasoning, as well as in neuropsychiatric disorders
and emotion, has remained obscure.
A UNIFIED INTERPRETATION THROUGH THE META-LEVELS
HYPOTHESIS
What we suggest in this paper is that, as a result of modular
connectivity with the cerebral cortex, causal relationships exist
between the low- and high-level cognitive functions that the cere-
bellum is thought to play. Finally, we conjecture that failure of this
system can lead to mental pathologies. The identified low-level
functions, timing, prediction, and learning, directly implement
structured cerebellar operations including forms ofworkingmem-
ory, error/novelty detection, and mental object manipulation. On
the one hand, timing, prediction, and learning have been related
to cellular and network operations [e.g., see Medina and Mauk
(2000); D’Angelo (2011); D’Angelo et al. (2011)], even though
there is, as yet, no precise understanding of the mechanisms
involved. On the other hand, these same functions may lie at
the basis of more complex functions including motor control,
attention switching, language processing, imagery and visuospatial
processing, decision-making, and reasoning. Finally, major aspects
of brain pathology can be predicted on the basis of these same
low- and high-level functions. In some cases, direct evidence of
these relationships has been demonstrated, while in others these
inter-dependencies are still implicit, providing scope for testing of
the hypothesis of cerebellar functioning based on its organization
into meta-levels (Figure 4).
Timing seems the most fundamental of all the low-level func-
tions. Timing may be directly explained on the basis of cir-
cuit mechanisms, whose cellular and synaptic components have
been partly revealed [e.g., see D’Angelo and De Zeeuw (2009);
D’Angelo et al. (2009)]. Timing is reflected in the ordering of
complex sequences ordinarily processed by the cerebellum and it
is deeply integrated with prediction and learning.
Sensory prediction, or, more generally, prediction, has been
shown to predominate in motor control, attention switch-
ing, working memory, and language processing (Shadmehr and
Mussa-Ivaldi, 2012), but it is also thought to intervene during
imagery and visuospatial processing (which are also components
of motor planning) and during decision-making and reasoning.
So-called fluid intelligence, a form of cognitive control involved
in executive functions (e.g., in the Tower of Hanoi test), rests on
a dynamic sequence of selective attention, planning, storage in
the working memory, hypothesis updating, attention redirecting,
and so on. It is thought that the cerebellum is involved, at least
when the problem is unusual and unexpected, according to its
error/novelty-detection function. The circuits underlying predic-
tion are unclear. It can be supposed that different inputs collide in
proper time frames generating patterns that can, at some level, be
recognized by pattern detectors. A model based on timing control
in the granular layer and pattern detection in the molecular layer
has been proposed (D’Angelo, 2011).
Learning in the cerebellum, and the original concepts related
to this, probably need to be revised and extended in the light of
new cellular and system physiology data. On the one hand, the
cerebellar cortex and nuclei are clearly endowed with numerous
mechanisms of long-term synaptic plasticity and therefore prob-
ably undergo changes during activity not just at the parallel
fiber-Purkinje cell synapse, but also at other synaptic sites (Hansel
et al., 2001; Jorntell and Hansel, 2006; Ohtsuki et al., 2009; Gao
et al., 2012). These distributed changes could have very differ-
ent meanings, for example that of controlling the spatiotemporal
dynamics of signal processing in the granular layer and percep-
tron operations in Purkinje cells. On the other hand, functional
imaging shows that the cerebellum is primarily involved when
unknown problems or circumstances are encountered. This sug-
gests that the cerebellum can incorporate specialized forms of
procedural memory that can be reconfigured and transmitted
to other brain areas. This learning can modify cerebellar spa-
tiotemporal processing in terms of timing, pattern recognition,
and coincidence detection, ultimately affecting the internal for-
ward model and the consequent predictive properties. Cerebellar
learning could contribute to working memory.
A puzzling implication of all this is that cerebellar processing
might, ultimately, take part in generating conscious and coherent
representations of the world, a function typically ascribed to the
thalmo-cortical loops. Indeed, rapid continuous cerebellar pro-
cessing in the cerebellar circuit through feedforward independent
modules could enhance the immediate and continuous represen-
tation of events, which is one of the key aspects of consciousness
(Addis et al., 2009; Nyberg et al., 2010; Szpunar, 2010, 2011).
Also worth noting is the specific involvement of the cerebellum in
elaborating problems of a statistical nature. In this case, it can be
imagined that, by imposing an internal dynamic model, the cere-
bellum helps to automatically elaborate the trend in a complex
data distribution on the basis of its previous acquisition of the
most probable data sets. Interestingly, many biologically relevant
problems have a statistical nature and the role of the cerebellum
in this sense should be further explored.
A dramatic translation of low-level into high-level functions
is observed in mental processing and even more clearly in
the related dysfunction occurring in certain brain diseases. In
schizophrenia, there is major failure of prediction-based com-
parison between internal and external representations, and of
coordinate transformation and therefore manipulation of mental
models. Similarly, autism involves a failure in redirecting atten-
tion, which can either be locked into internal contents or be
hyperfocused on selective objects. In depression, psychotic symp-
toms may be regarded as a loss of internal coherence between
internally and externally generated signals, with consequent dys-
regulation of mood homeostasis. Finally, in dyslexia, a combi-
nation of failures in the phonological loop involving working
memory and recognition and manipulation of mental objects
could be involved.
CONCLUSIONS
The meta-levels hypothesis provides a key through which to
order the multitude of manifestations of cerebellar physiology
and pathology and reconcile the basic cerebellar functional mech-
anisms with the emerging properties of the network. The meta-
levels hypothesis leads to testable predictions and opens the ways
for new experimental designs. These can be broadly divided into
those addressing (1) how the olivo-cerebellar system generates
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its internal representations and operations, (2) how the emerg-
ing functions derive from connections of the cerebellum with
other brain structures, and (3) how dysfunction of the system
could lead to pathology. In general, tools like genetic engineering
in experimental animals, large-scale mathematical modeling and
non-invasive stimulation/recording technology (like TMS and
fMRI) in humans could provide valuable information. For exam-
ple, genetic mutations impairing LTP (Long-Term Potentiation)
or LTD (Long-Term Depression) could be used to investigate the
potential role of the various forms of long-term synaptic plastic-
ity expressed by cerebellar synapses not just with respect to motor
learning but also with respect to cognitive processing extending
through the CTCCs. Moreover, the role of cellular properties on
circuit and system computations could be analyzed using detailed
mathematical models, the CTCCs could be investigated by DTI,
and their functional activation during specific tasks identified by
fMRI. These same techniques could improve brain disease anal-
ysis and therapy. For example, cerebellar TMS has an impact on
different pathologies, including Parkinson’s disease (Koch et al.,
2009a), epilepsy (Brighina et al., 2006), and stroke (Webster et al.,
2006). Ultimately, this analysis could contribute to the devel-
opment of a theory on global brain functioning in which the
cerebellum is considered an integral part and not just a structure
purely devoted to motor control.
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